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a b s t r a c t
The Extended Euclidean algorithm provides a fast solution to the problem of finding the
greatest common divisor of two numbers. In this paper, we present three applications
of the algorithm to the security and privacy field. The first one allows one to privately
distribute a secret to a set of recipients with only one multicast communication. It can
be used for rekeying purposes in a Secure Multicast scenario. The second one is an
authenticationmechanism to be used in environments inwhich a public-key infrastructure
is not available. Finally, the third application of the Extended Euclidean algorithm is a zero-
knowledge proof that reduces the number of messages between the two parts involved,
with the aid of a central server.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Multicast communications allow a host to simultaneously send information to a set of other hosts, avoiding the
establishment of point-to-point connections with all of them. IP multicast technologies (which use routing techniques at a
low level over a network, such as the IGMP protocol) have not achieved the expected success due to several reasons (need for
compatible routers, implantation costs, lack of support from Internet providers, etc.). As a recent alternative, application level
multicast has taken over, since it offers the same functionality at a lower cost and easier deployment. Instead of requiring
physical deployment, a logical network is built, and hosts resend messages themselves.
Multicast communications can be either one-to-many, if the source of the transmitted data is one entity only over time
(such as IPTV or P2PTV services) or many-to-many, if several clients or all act as a source of data. Multiconferences are an
example of this (strictly, each data source establishes a one-to-many multicast communication).
There are services that take advantage of multicast but need to keep communications private. Those technologies that
make it possible are known as secure multicast. Applications of secure multicast are, among others, pay-per-view IPTV or
P2PTV, private multiconferences (oriented to business, politics or even military affairs), or any private service that involves
several participants or clients.
The typical approach to establish secure multicast communications is to agree on one or several symmetric encryption
keys to encrypt messages (depending on the topology and size of the network). However the key, or keys, must be renewed
periodically to prevent attacks from outsiders or even insiders.
Depending on how key distribution and management are carried out, secure multicast schemes are divided into
centralized and distributed. Centralized schemes depend directly on a single entity to distribute every cryptographic key,
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therefore being able to copewith smaller audiences than their distributed alternatives. On the other hand, keymanagement
is more complex in a distributed approach, usually involving entities that act as local subservers and manage subgroups of
users, and requiring full or partial data re-encryption in some cases. Given that the scheme proposed in this paper belongs
to the first kind, the following paragraphs review some well known centralized previous solutions.
RFC 2627 [1] presents some approaches to the problem. Among all, the Hierarchical Tree Approach (HTA) is the
recommended option. It uses a logical tree arrangement of the users in order to facilitate key distribution. The benefit of
this idea is that the storage requirement for each client and the number of transmissions required for key renewal are both
logarithmic in the number of members.
Contemporary to HTA, the LKH (Local Key Hierarchy) scheme [2] is very similar in its tree approach. Its novelty relies on
the proposal of three different rekeying strategies: user-oriented, which uses many short messages for a rekeying operation,
key-oriented, which broadcasts more messages at a lower computational cost, and group-oriented, which employs one sole
message of larger size. The LKH scheme is one of the most popular and widely used [3].
An extension to the latter, LKH++, is presented in [4] with wireless networks as target. The authors combine the fact that
many auxiliary keys are shared among users in LKHwith a hash function thus allowing users to derive new encryption keys
by themselves with little input information from the key server.
One-way function trees (OFT) [5] are an extension to the hierarchical tree approach. A key tree is also used, but in this
case every internal key is built depending on its two descendant keys: both descendants are blinded by means of a one-way
function and the results are wired to the input of a mixing function. The tree, therefore, is built on a bottom-top fashion.
Members, placed at the leaves, know their own key, the keys in the path to the root and the blinded sibling keys of the path.
Thanks to that, the amount of information needed by a member to recompute the whole path of keys to the root is smaller
and rekeying messages are shorter (approximately half of HTA’s).
The ELK protocol [6] is an improvement of HTA. It is similar to OFT in the sense that intermediate keys are generated
from its children, but pseudo-random functions (PRFs) are used rather than one-way functions. Thanks to PRFs and to timely
rekeying no broadcast of information is needed in join events (only unicast messages for tree maintenance). Additionally,
ELK addresses message loss tolerance by introducing the concept of hints: small pieces of information attached to broadcast
data packets that allow one to recover lost rekey information.
A similar approach is adopted by the SKD scheme [7]: that users be able to predict new keys upon a rekeying operation
with the least possible amount of information from the key server. SKD combines encryption and one-way functions.
The Secure Lock solution is proposed in [8]. The authors take a computational approach to the problem rather than a tree
arrangement. It is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem, its main drawback being the inefficient computations required
at the key server side on each rekey operation: the computation time needed quickly becomes excessive when the number
of members grows [9].
In [10], a divide-and-conquer extension to Secure Lock is proposed. It combines the Hierarchical Tree Approach and the
Secure Lock: members are arranged in a HTA fashion, but Secure Lock is used to refresh keys on each tree level. Therefore,
the number of computations required by Secure Lock is reduced.
An IETF Working Group, MSEC [11], is currently working in a set of protocols to standardize secure multicast. They are
focusing, in an initial stage, in IP-layer centralized multicast, assuming the presence of groups and a single trusted entity in
each one.
These technologies make a good job assuring privacy and (in most cases) an efficient key refreshment. However, they
do not cover other aspects such as authentication or trust among peers. This paper presents a secure multicast solution for
centralized scenarios that provides:
1. private communications and efficient key refreshment,
2. key server messages authentication, and
3. validation among peers.
Three different and complementary schemes are proposed in order to achieve the proposed goals. Depending on the
scenario and its necessities the schemes can be implemented along with the others or on their own.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the scenario conditions we assume for our solution. Section 3
presents the key refreshment scheme, as well as a security and efficiency discussion, a comparison with the state of the
art and simulation results. Sections 4 and 5 introduce and discuss the schemes for key server messages authentication and
verification among hosts, respectively. Finally, the conclusions of the paper are presented in Section 6.
2. Scenario
The target scenario is the following: private communications must be established within a restricted group. There is a
central server that manages key management issues. From now on, we will refer to the server as the Key Server, and to
the clients or users as members. Depending on the nature of the service, communications can be either one-to-many or
many-to-many.
In any case, forward secrecy must be maintained. This requirement implies that a member which leaves the network
(i.e. her membership expires) should not be able to decrypt any ciphered information transmitted after her exit, and forces
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the encryption keys to refresh whenever a member leaves the network. Some services may require backward secrecy: an
arrivingmember should not be able to decrypt any ciphered information transmitted before her arrival. This imposes, again,
a refreshment of the keys when amember enters the system.We assume our scenario requires it too. These two restrictions
may become an efficiency problem if the churn rate (joins and leaves) is too high. The scheme proposed here is efficient
enough to cope with high churn rates, as will be shown next.
Obviously, the security and privacy features of an application level securemulticast solution should not only be restricted
to private communications. Authentication is a key issue, too. Members should have a way to check that the source of a
message is a trusted entity, either if the source is the Key Server or other member.
3. Distribution of secrets within closed groups
The first scheme allows the Key Server to generate and privately distribute encryption keys among restricted audiences
so private communications can be established. Its most relevant features are:
• Only one message is generated per rekeying operation.
• Suitable for all topologies. No need for node hierarchies, though they can be supported.
• No need for message re-encryption.
• Only one secret piece of info is held by each client. We call this piecesmember tickets.
• Cost-effective and easy to deploy.
Let us assume r is the symmetric encryption key to be multicast, and that there are n members at a given time. The
following paragraphs explain how the scheme works.
When a member i joins, the Key Server assigns it a member ticket, xi. Every ticket is a large prime1 and is communicated
to the correspondingmember under a secure channel: SSL/TLS, for example. This communication is made once per member
only, so it does not affect global efficiency. All tickets must be different from each other, at least during a relatively wide
period of time. Note that xi is known only by its owner and the Key Server, and r is shared by all members and the Key Server.
Algorithm 1 shows the generation and distribution of r .
Algorithm 1 The rekeying algorithm
1. The Key Server selects:
i. m and p, large prime numbers, such thatm− 1 = p · q.
ii. k and δ, such that δ = k+ p and δ < xi, for every i = 1 . . . n.
iii. g that verifies 1 = gpmodm.
The encryption key to be distributed is r = gkmodm.
2. The Key Server calculates L =ni=1 xi. L is kept private in the Key Server.
3. The Key Server finds u, v, by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm [12] such that
u · δ + v · L = 1 (1)
4. The Key Server multicasts (makes public) g, m and u on plain text.
5. Each member i calculates u−1mod xi = δ and gδmodm = gkmodm = r .
New values form, g, p and/or kmust be chosen for each refreshment of r . Note that δ, u and v depend on them and will
change as they do.
Some remarks can be made to the algorithm. First, a proper value g at step 1.iii is easy to calculate: once the Key Server
has chosen m = p · q + 1, a value a is chosen satisfying that m − 1 is the least integer such that am−1 mod m = 1 (that
is, a is a primitive value from Zm). Then g = aq mod m. Second, the length of r , by definition, cannot exceed that of m, but
that should not be a problem for standard symmetric cryptosystems. Third, fortunately it is not necessary, for successive
refreshments, to recompute L from scratch if there were joins or leaves: L should be multiplied by the incoming members’
tickets, and divided by those of the leavingmembers. That speeds the process up. And fourth, the Key Servermight decide to
refresh r after a long period of time with no members joining or leaving for security reasons. That operation is called batch
rekeying.
Although the presented method is fast (an efficiency discussion follows), there are scenarios, like pay-per-view IPTV
services, in which rekeying is performed at extremely high rates. In those cases a key hierarchy solution can be adopted,
such as in [13], and our method used to refresh the highest level key.
1 Strictly, it is sufficient that all xi are coprime and greater than δ. In that case, however, it would be necessary that every xi has a large prime factor in
order to make the factorization of L harder (δ and Lwill be introduced shortly).
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3.1. Proof of correctness for the disclosure scheme
Given that δ < xi, i = 1 . . . n and with every xi prime (or coprime at least), it is clear that:
gcd(δ, xi) = 1, for every i = 1, . . . , n
and hence,
gcd(δ, L) = 1. (2)
Eq. (2) ensures, by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, the existence of u, v ∈ Z such that δ · u+ v · L = 1, from where it is
deduced that δ · u = 1 mod xi and so u−1 = δ mod xi, for every i = 1, . . . , n. The Chinese Remainder Theorem guarantees
that the solution for u−1 mod xi = δ and δ < xi, for every i = 1, . . . , n is unique.
The value r = gk mod m is obtained as shown next:
gδ = gk+p mod m
= gk · 1 mod m
= gk mod m
g is public, but the use of δ assures that an outsider will not be able to guess k and, therefore, r .
3.2. Scalability considerations for the rekeying algorithm
Kruus [14] suggests five issues that a multicast key management protocol must address. They are:
1. efficiency in initial keying,




There is no difference in our scheme between first time keying (requirement 1) and further rekeying operations. Rekeying
operations are simple (requirement 2): the Key Server generates a single message which is injected into the multicast
network on plain text, since only authorized members will be able to process it correctly. Requirements 3, 4 and 5 are
discussed next.
We can observe that L will be large, given that L = ni=1 xi. So will be u (recall Eq. (1)). In order to estimate it, assume
for the rest of the paper that every xi value is stored in an unsigned binary data type of b bits. The greatest value that can be
represented is 2b−1. Assume also there are nmembers. Themaximum length of L is then n ·b bits. That is also themaximum
length of u.
As an example, for b = 64 and n = 1000 the maximum length of u is 64000 bits ≈ 8 KBs. Though that is an affordable
message length for many devices (requirement 4), a shorter message would be desirable.
From the previous consideration we assume that Kruus’ requirements 3 and 5 are the weakest points of our scheme. The
solution that allows one to overcome these problems consists of logically dividing the audience into s disjoint subgroups
while delivering the same encryption key to all of them. This can be done by running a different instance of the algorithm
for every subgroup, with some variations: values m, g, p and k are the same for every subgroup j (and so is δ), but each
partial product, Lpartj with j ∈ [1, s] from now on, contains the product of the tickets of the members within the given
subgroup only. With this modification the same key is delivered to every subgroup by means of several shorter messages
that are disseminated throughout the network, which is more convenient in terms of efficiency. Now every peer needs only
to process the short message addressed to its subgroup.
However, the join and leave operations still require thewhole set ofmembers to obtain a newkey, therefore s refreshment
messages (g,m and the corresponding u) must be computed and multicasted now; each one for a different subgroup. Fig. 1
shows an example: note that all subgroups receive the same g andm (which guarantees that the same key is obtained) but
a different u, due to the use of different Lpart values, Lpart1 = xAxBxCxD, Lpart2 = xExFxGxH and Lpart3 = xIxJxK xL.
It is important to remark that such division is logical and independent from the topology of the network, that is, the
underlying topology is not affected, neither dissemination of the encrypted information nor rekey messages. Only the Key
Server is aware of the global arrangement, while a given peer knows only which subgroup it belongs to. However, in the
case that the network topology is naturally divided through time (such as a regional division, for example) a topology-aware
logical arrangement may be used.
Adopting the subgroups approach bringsmany benefits, even though the final bandwidth requirements does not change.
First, it is obvious that, for a fixed number of members, the length of u values decreases linearly as the number of
subgroups increases. In the previous example, arranging the same audience in 20 groups of 50 members would yield 20
messages of 3200 bits = 400 Bs maximum, each one shorter than a typical X.509 certificate. Shorter messages will be
handled more easily and quickly by the recipients. This means less hardware requirements.
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Fig. 1. The subgroup extension to the scheme. Capital letters denote members. r is the multicasted encryption key.
Second, the message generation process that takes place at the Key Server can be sped up. Every different u can now
be computed by a separate process, which may run concurrently with the others. This is specially appropriate for current
multi-core processors. The whole process can be sped up by almost s times if the software is properly tuned.
This subgroup approach provides a better scalability, allowing to increase the maximum number of clients that can be
handled. As a remark, users should be assigned to subgroups in a balanced way in order to keep refreshment messages as
short as possible. This raises other issues, such as the problem of rebalancing subgroups after a leave avalanche, for example.
3.3. Security
Security in the distribution of r relies on the unfeasibility of calculating the right δ in a reasonable time if a valid xi is not
known by the attacker (recall that values for Eq. (1) in Algorithm 1 are unique). The privacy of k and p is guaranteed if:
• a sufficiently large value is chosen form,
• p and q have a similar bitlength (recall thatm− 1 = p · q).
In that case factorizing m − 1 will be more difficult. Additionally, a strong prime can be chosen for m. Next, security is
discussed considering three different types of attacker.
Security against a passive adversary.
First, we assume the presence of an adversary who neither has nor has had a valid ticket. Her intention is to learn about
the secret value that is being disclosed to legalmembers. Thosemembers, aswas explained in step 5 of Algorithm1, compute
amodular inverse by using their corresponding ticket as themodulo. Clearly, the knowledge of k also implies the knowledge
of both δ and p. On one hand p is kept private at the Key Server. On the other hand it is not necessary to get p in order to
get the distributed k, say gk, it is enough to get δ and then act as an authorized user. If we take into account δ is the unique
solution of the congruence system x = u−1 mod xi in the interval [0, L − 1], the calculus of such a δ involves knowing L,
which is kept private at the server, or one valid ticket xi, which would be equivalent to be an authorized user. Therefore, the
alternative is a force-brute attack that, trying with a huge number of possible keys, 2b, being b the key bitlength.
Security against an active adversary.
Consider the case of a legal member who either is still authorized or her ticket has already expired but keeps rekeying
messages from her authorization period. In both cases, she could try to compromise other authorized users’ tickets as
follows: she knows that u · δ = 1 mod L, i.e., L divides u · δ − 1. Then by factoring u · δ − 1 she would get all factors in L
(tickets). Therefore this attack involves a factorization problem that is hard to solve if the tickets used in the construction
of L are big enough. Another possible attack is to use two consecutive in time values of δ in order to get some information
about any other member’s ticket. Consider two pairs (u, δ) and (u′, δ′) as before. Then the quotient u·δ−1u′·δ′−1 would reveal
the value of L. However this does not yield any information about other users’ tickets since again the factorization of L is
involved. Finally, a former user who still holds her old ticket might try to intercept a refreshment message and use her own
old ticket expecting that it has been reassigned to a newmember. If that was the case it is clear that she would be successful
in recovering the secret r . The way to prevent this attack is to never reuse tickets (or for a large period of time at least).
3.4. Comparison with other schemes
Table 1 compares our schemewith other well-known centralized alternatives, whichwere briefly presented in Section 1.
More concretely, we consider the Hierarchical Tree Approach (HTA) in its ‘‘multiple keys per message’’ version [1], LKH [2]
and its extension LKH++ [4], OFT [5], SKD [7], ELK [6] and Secure Lock extended with HTA [10]. Our scheme is analyzed in
its subgroups version (see Section 3.2).
Some of the information shown in the table was taken from [15–17], while the notation used is explained in the table
itself. In order to make a fair comparison three assumptions have been made:
• both backward and forward secrecy are provided,
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Table 1
Secure multicast schemes comparison. n is the number of members, s is the number of subgroups where applicable, d is the tree degree and h is the tree
depth where applicable.
HTA LKH LKH++ OFT SKD ELK SecLock+ HTA Ours
Keys stored in Key Server dh − 1 2n− 1 2n− 1 2n− 1 dn−1d−1 2n− 1 dh − 1 n
Keys stored in member h+ 1 h+ 1 h+ 1 h+ 1 h h+ 1 h+ 1 1
Broadcast messages per Join (d− 1)h 2h− 1 h+ 1 h+ 1 h 0 h s
Broadcast messages per Leave (d− 1)h 2h h+ 1 h+ 1 (d− 1)h h h s
Table 2
Key Server execution times for different ticket lengths and group sizes.
Group size Tickets bitlength
64 128 256 512 1024 2048
500 0.0453 0.0553 0.0889 0.4692 4.0388 53.5010
1000 0.0466 0.0542 0.0865 0.3924 4.0335 55.3955
2000 0.0433 0.0553 0.1058 0.4353 4.3906 61.0202
4000 0.0444 0.0644 0.1059 0.4888 4.3394 65.7045
10000 0.0547 0.0808 0.1192 0.4671 5.3760 68.3713
• trees (where applicable) are balanced and full,
• subgroups (where applicable) are balanced and full.
Join and leave events are for a single member. Unicast communications are not shown in the table, since they do not affect
global efficiency.
Results depend on several variables. The number ofmembers is, obviously, themost important of them all. For tree-based
schemes the degree is also a decisive factor since it determines the number of intermediate keys. In our scheme, the size
and number of subgroups are the main variables to pay attention to. Notation is explained in the table itself.
Regarding storage, our scheme has the lowest requirements: the amount of information to be stored by the Key Server
is directly proportional to the number of users. The tree based schemes must maintain a set of keys for the intermediate
logical nodes of the tree (note that 2n− 1 is equivalent to dh − 1 for the case d = 2). Subsets of those keys must be held by
the corresponding members, too. In our scheme members only need to store their own ticket.
ELK is ahead of the rest in join events. The combination of a logical tree layout and PRFs allows all members to recompute
their key path to the root without any broadcast communication, though some unicast messages are occasionally required
for member reallocation. Our scheme sends a broadcast message per group. The rest need one or more messages per tree
level.
Leave operations require, in most cases, the same number of messages as joins. Tree-based schemes may need, again,
some unicast messages for layout maintenance purposes. Our scheme needs no unicast messages.
It is worth remarking that tree-based schemes need members to be aware of their location within the logical tree: they
must hold the intermediate keys that connect them to the tree root (the group key), and recompute all the way back
whenever the tree is renewed. Members in our scheme only need to know which subgroup they belong to. This makes
member computations simple and fast.
Finally, flash crowds should be considered too. They occur when large sets of users enter or leave the system in a short
interval of time. A typical example are pay-per-viewmassive interest TV events (e.g. soccermatches). At the beginning of the
event a great number of users enter the system, which forces one to constantly refresh the group key. At the end of the event
those users leave the system, therefore a great number of leave operations must be performed. Tree-oriented schemes may
suffer in flash crowd scenarios since the tree structure needs to be continuously rearranged to avoid degeneration, specially
at leave events. On the contrary, our scheme can handle subgroups management very efficiently: only multiplications or
divisions are needed and there is no structure to maintain. At the start of an event new subgroups can be established if
needed, while at the end, the remaining users can be quickly reallocated so the number of subgroups is reduced.
3.5. Simulation
Wehave developed a Java implementation of the scheme in order to perform simulations and obtain execution times. The
BigInteger Java class was used for handling large numbers, and the Miller-Rabin test [12] was employed to check primality.
Figs. 2 and 3 show execution times for Algorithm 1, both in the Key Server and in a member, for different group sizes and
ticket lengths. Tables 2 and 3 show the plotted data. They were obtained in a Intel Core 2 Duo processor at 2, 26 GHz with
3 MB of L2 cache and 2 GB of RAM.
Two main conclusions can be extracted from the Key Server times. First, key pair refreshment messages are computed
very fast, excepting in the case of 2048 bits. Thismeans that the scheme can be applied to awide variety of scenarios. Second,
execution times aremainly affected by ticket length and not by the number ofmembers considered. That is good newswhen
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Fig. 2. Key Server execution times for different ticket lengths and network sizes.
Fig. 3. Member execution times for different ticket lengths and network sizes.
Table 3
Member execution times for different ticket lengths and group sizes.
Group size Tickets bitlength
64 128 256 512 1024 2048
500 0.0003 0.0011 0.0020 0.0040 0.0102 0.0619
1000 0.0007 0.0016 0.0025 0.0048 0.0133 0.0696
2000 0.0012 0.0020 0.0034 0.0074 0.0208 0.0918
4000 0.0019 0.0028 0.0052 0.0122 0.0476 0.1464
10000 0.0028 0.0045 0.0097 0.0259 0.0936 0.3042
large audiences are addressed. However, recall that the length of the refreshment message might force the audience to be
split into several subgroups (see Section 3.2).
Member times show that retrieving the secret is a very fast process. In some scenarios the subgroups approach might be
desirable in order to reduce memory requirements in members’ hardware.
3.6. Disclosure of public keys
The scheme proposed in this paper can be used for an additional purpose: the refreshment of asymmetric key pairs and
the disclosure of the public part. Recall that the encryption key delivered to the audience has the form r = gk mod m, which
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is similar to an Elgamal public key [18]. An Elgamal key pair has the form:
Kpub : g,m, gk mod m
Kpriv : k.
Therefore, the method can be seen as a way of controlling the disclosure of Elgamal public keys: the public key is only
communicated to a closed group of recipients. The key pair can then be used for signature purposes (only the Key Sever
knows the private key k) or for encryption of messages addressed to the Key Server.
4. Key refreshment message authentication
At this point we have achieved privacy in multicast communications. This section presents a mechanism that
authenticates the refreshment messages from the Key Server: that is required in order to protect the system against forged
rekeyingmessages. The usual technology for message authentication is digital signature: a hash of themessage is encrypted
with the sender’s private key. The receiver can then decrypt the hash and compare it with its own result of a hash operation
on the received information.
Wepropose an approachwhich is not based in the use of public key cryptography, as a fast, straight and simple alternative
for scenarios inwhich a public key infrastructure is not available. Our solution proves that the sender either knows or ignores
the recipient’s ticket. The two only entities in the system that know any given ticket are its ownermember and the Key Sever.
Assuming the ticket has not been stolen, any message received by a member that successfully runs the verification scheme
can only come from the Key Server. The authenticationmethod naturally arises from the rekeyingmaterial and no additional
infrastructure is needed.
Algorithm 2 shows the rekey message authentication process. We assume the Key Server is performing a refreshment of
r , and therefore the authentication process is complementary to that described in Section 3. We assume, too, that members
receive the refreshment message.
Algorithm 2 The key refreshment message authentication algorithm
1. The Key server:
i. computes s = (gk)−1 mod L by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm,
ii. chooses a random number a, such that a < xi, for every xi, and
iii. multicasts {a · s, h(a)}, where h(a) is the output of a one-way operation on a. Such operation is not specified here.
2. Every member i receives the authentication message and computes h(a · s · r mod xi), which should be equal to the value
h(a) received if xi is a factor of L.
It is convenient that the authentication message is attached to the refreshment message so authenticity can be verified
upon reception. If the subgroups approach is used for rekeying then each partial rekeying message for group j must be
authenticated separately, using the corresponding Lpartj value.
4.1. Security and efficiency considerations
Regarding security, the key point is that a · s · r mod α is only equal to a if α = L or α = xi∀xi. An attacker willing to
forge an authenticated key refreshment message must know either L or at least one xi. In the first case the forged message
will pass the verification test in every client, while in the second case only the owner of xi will be fooled. However, both L
and every xi are kept secret, and stealing them is equivalent to stealing a private key. We can therefore state that in terms
of security, and for the scenario described in Section 2, the authentication scheme proposed here is a valid substitute for
digital signature.
Regarding efficiency, the arbitrary-precision arithmetic additional operations required at the Key Server side are a
modular inverse and a multiplication. On the other hand, every client must compute a modular multiplication. Those
operations have very little impact on the final runtime since they can be run very efficiently by any hardwarewith arbitrary-
precision arithmetic capabilities.
The scheme poses a disadvantage, however: the authentication message can be as long as the key refreshment message.
This should be taken into account in low bit rate scenarios.
5. Peer validation: a zero-knowledge proof
Once secure multicast and Key Server messages validation have been achieved, the last proposal in this paper deals with
authentication among peers. The aim is to verify whether a given peer j holds a valid ticket xj without gaining knowledge
of the latter: this means that j is a legal peer, assuming no information leakage. Verification is carried out by means of a
challenge, with no disclosure of any private nor sensible information. The scheme is presented next.
Assume that peer i wants to verify whether peer b is a legal peer, prior to establishing communications with it.
Algorithm 3 shows the process.
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Algorithm 3 The peer validation algorithm.
1. Peer i chooses a random integerwi such that 1 < wi < m and sends it to the Key Server.
2. The Key Server computes the challenge invi = w−1i mod L and sends it to i.
3. Peer i sends {invi, gxi mod m} to b.
4. Peer b calculateswb = inv−1i mod xb, βj = wb · (gxi)xb and sends {βb, gxb} to i.
5. Peer i computes βi = wi · (gxb)xi , which should be equal to βb.
Ifβi = βb then it is clear that b owns a valid ticket xb. Otherwise peer i shouldwarn the Key Server so preventivemeasures
can be taken against b. Modular inverses can be computed by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
In case this protocol is implemented in a standalone manner and no public key disclosure algorithm is being run then
the Key Server must choose the values values g and m as shown in Section 3 and communicate them to peers before any
authentication is done.
5.1. Security and efficiency considerations
Security is ensured by two facts:
1. peer b needs to know a valid ticket xb in order to obtain awb equal towi, by means of a modular inverse calculation (step
4), and
2. the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field [19].
We warn now against the possibility of performing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Key Server and peer b, if
a malicious entity sends verification requests at an intentional very high rate. That same entity might arbitrarily warn the
Key Server against legal peers, too.
Regarding scalability, the protocol involves one communication with the Key Server, which clearly limits its application
range. Next, two extensions that partially alleviate the problem are proposed. Both can be combined together.
Challenge precomputation. Peer i sends a list of severalwi values, (wi1, . . . , win), to the Key Server on each request. The Key
Server replies with the corresponding list of challenges, (invi1, . . . , invin), that can then be used by i when needed. A new
request to the Key Server is issued when all, or near to all, challenges have been used. Note, however, that challenges are
only valid until the next rekeying operation due to the change of L.
Subgroups approach with trusted super-peers. With the subgroups approach, the global L value is split into different, smaller
Lpartj values. If fully trusted super-peers are introduced, each one receiving an updated version of one or more distinct
Lpartj values from the Key Server, then they can act as signature servers, thus alleviating workload at the Key Server side
and increasing overall scalability. Peers can now send their challenge requests to the corresponding super-peer. Given that
super-peers are fully trusted our security considerations still hold, and tickets within the product Lpartj still remain private.
Even if a super-peer went malicious and tried to gain access to the tickets, it still should have to factorize Lpartj , which is a
computationally impractical task if a proper ticket bitlength is chosen.
6. Conclusions
Wehave presented three different uses for the Extended EuclideanAlgorithm, all of them focusing onprivacy and security
in multicast scenarios. The first one, a rekeying mechanism, allows a single entity to manage the distribution and renewal
of encryption keys within restricted groups, so private communications can be held. The communication can be done in a
single multicast message, and there is no need for encryption. The mechanism is secure, and simulation results were shown
to prove its efficiency, both on the Key Server and on the client side.
The second application is an authentication mechanismwhich is not based on public-key cryptography. It can be used in
situations in which the latter is not available, and can be run along with the first scheme.
Finally, a zero-knowledge protocol was presented which can be used for validation between two clients. By using this
protocol clients can decide whether to trust others or not before establishing communications with them. It works by
challenging clients to demonstrate that they own a valid ticket. No sensible information is disclosed.
The three mechanisms can be applied to the same scenario, say, a peer-to-peer television platform. Future lines of
research include the implementation and test of a combination of them in a simulator (e.g. PeerSim [20]) or a real testbed,
such as PlanetLab [21].
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